Today let’s talk about these guys. The Banki district (mantiqa) of #ISWAP. In fact, it’s mostly former fighters of #JASDJ #BokoHaram whose commander, Baana Dschongori, accepted to rally ISWAP after the death of Shekau in May 2021.
I want to talk about the mechanisms that ISWAP has used to incorporate them, as told by two fighters who witnessed this – it’s telling of ISWAP’s thinking and capacity.
So, right after Shekau’s death, they called Dschongori in Sambisa for talks. And Dschongori accepted to follow them. While ISWAP set out to disarm the fighters in Sambisa, they actually gave weapons and four cars to Dschongori.
He holds a key location on the way to ISWAP's in Lake Chad, and near Banki, the border town with Cameroon, and can fend off attacks from a JASDJ group that did not join ISWAP based in the Mandara mountains…
Abubakar Mainok, one of the top ISWAP leaders, came in person. He stayed 15 days, giving conferences explaining the new ways to the commanders, who then had to brief their men (under supervision).
When he went back, Mainok took Dschongori with him to the ISWAP core in Lake Chad, Dschongori spent two months, returning after that.
Also, ISWAP sent a team of 50 people, some from its administration (idariyya), some from its internal security (amniyya). They trained selected members of Dschongori’s group. They set up an office with computers and paperwork. They created a repair shop.
They built a prison (prisons are much more important for ISWAP than for Shekau - I need to write the Lake Chad edition of Discipline and punish). They taught detention procedures.
They created an amniyya unit, putting the local hisbah commander in charge (hisbah is much less important and powerful under ISWAP than under JAS; ISWAP relies a lot on the rijal amn)
And then ISWAP took 50+ of Dschongori’s men, sending them to core ISWAP areas for a 90-day internship. They saw the ways things were done, joined combat, followed training. They were then sent back.
ISWAP seriously rationalised the troops. They made Dschongori a jaysh, giving him a fiya and four qaid. Units were standardised. Each qaid four munzir, each munzir four naqib, each naqib 20 men. In the time of Shekau, there were sometimes up to 100 men to a naqib!
This means they asked the leaders to screen their fighters, and sent back many to civilian life – farming and trading. They act as a reserve and can be brought in to replace those who are killed or defect.
Incidentally, this gives us an idea of Mantiqa Banki’s standing troops: in theory, 20x4x4x4 – 1280 fighters. In addition to that, one must add the rijal amn and hisbah, who can fight – maybe a few hundred in all? And I suppose the reserve could be brought in if need be.
As elsewhere, ISWAP has banned the plunder (fey’u) of Muslim civilians. By way of compensation, ISWAP pays a little money monthly to the fighters – 10,000 to 15,000 nairas (about 10 USD). And they pay money for ghanima, loot captured in combat, which ISWAP buys from the fighters.
All this speaks to a fairly elaborate system, with a strategy, investments in human resources and bureaucratic control... Unimaginable in the time of Shekau. A clear indication of the influence of the Islamic State.
But does this new model work? Is it sustainable? The ban on fey’u has been a difficult change for many… A significant number of people have left. As one former fighter (a defector himself) said, “In ten, four have left, I think. People are leaving because there is no fey’u.”
Not easy to maintain a more professional, bureaucratised and controlled force… There has to be an economy in place for that...
The aspiration to statehood (and bureaucracy), the push towards the rationalisation of jihad, seems strong indeed. But again, how sustainable is it? swp-berlin.org
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