@Jethro_Norman, read your article with interest, unfortunately its fraught with errors and very broad generalisations.
I've listed some of my issues below, care to respond?
I've listed some of my issues below, care to respond?
1. Perception
I counted 6 uses of the word "perception" in your piece. This is very problematic as perception is very personal, and highly subjective.
Your article does not question the veracity of claims of marginalisation, just amplifies them without any fact-checking.
I counted 6 uses of the word "perception" in your piece. This is very problematic as perception is very personal, and highly subjective.
Your article does not question the veracity of claims of marginalisation, just amplifies them without any fact-checking.
If we look at the numbers:
Dhulbahante-inhabited districts in East Sool proportionally receive more developmental projects than Isaaq-inhabited districts in West Sool.
From Somaliland's 2022 budget (courtesy @GulfOfBerbera):
slmof.org
Dhulbahante-inhabited districts in East Sool proportionally receive more developmental projects than Isaaq-inhabited districts in West Sool.
From Somaliland's 2022 budget (courtesy @GulfOfBerbera):
slmof.org
Digging more into the figures, Sool as a region generates a tiny % of Somaliland's budget of about 1.29% or $744,000.
More money goes back into developing Sool from Somaliland's budget than Sool actually generates in revenue. Its the most lopsided arrangement of any SL region.
More money goes back into developing Sool from Somaliland's budget than Sool actually generates in revenue. Its the most lopsided arrangement of any SL region.
The concluded first phase of the Somaliland Development Fund saw USD 11 million of total USD 59 million allocated for Sool and Sanaag.
Thats +18% of the total allocation.
This fact is attested to even by @UKinSomalia:
somalilanddevelopmentfund.org
Thats +18% of the total allocation.
This fact is attested to even by @UKinSomalia:
somalilanddevelopmentfund.org
So where is the economic marginalisation you speak of?
Somaliland is a poor unrecognised state, but Dhulbahante receive more in developmental aid than their share as % of population.
If anything, Isaaq territories in Sool and Sanaag are the ones overlooked.
Somaliland is a poor unrecognised state, but Dhulbahante receive more in developmental aid than their share as % of population.
If anything, Isaaq territories in Sool and Sanaag are the ones overlooked.
2. Political marginalisation
You also mentioned political marginalisation particularly of Dhulbahante. Instead of discussing intangibles (e.g. perception), lets look at the numbers..
You also mentioned political marginalisation particularly of Dhulbahante. Instead of discussing intangibles (e.g. perception), lets look at the numbers..
Sool is the least populated region of Somaliland.
UNFPA's 2014 population survey estimates Sool excluding Caynabo and Isaaq inhabited portion of Xudun district to be ~ 5% of Somaliland's population.
Dhulbahante's 6 MPs = 7.3% of total SL MPs.
Where is the marginalisation???
UNFPA's 2014 population survey estimates Sool excluding Caynabo and Isaaq inhabited portion of Xudun district to be ~ 5% of Somaliland's population.
Dhulbahante's 6 MPs = 7.3% of total SL MPs.
Where is the marginalisation???
But thats not the full story.
Dhulbahante's candidates in Sool received on average, 1536 votes, one of the lowest of all clans in SL.
The average vote/candidate for other clans in Sool/Sanaag:
Habar Jeclo (Sool) = 2284 per candidate.
Garxajis (Sanaag) = 2158 per candidate.
Dhulbahante's candidates in Sool received on average, 1536 votes, one of the lowest of all clans in SL.
The average vote/candidate for other clans in Sool/Sanaag:
Habar Jeclo (Sool) = 2284 per candidate.
Garxajis (Sanaag) = 2158 per candidate.
Yasiin Faratoon received the most votes of any Dhulbahante candidate @ 4,456 votes. This is less than all other equivalent subclans in Somaliland.
As an example, the candidate of the Arab subclan of Isaaq from Togdheer Maxamed Rambo received 5887 votes.
As an example, the candidate of the Arab subclan of Isaaq from Togdheer Maxamed Rambo received 5887 votes.
This is the demographic reality often ignored by foreign commentators on Somaliland:
SL is a democracy, and votes = representation.
Why is that concept ignored in your article @Jethro_Norman?
Here is a question for you , what would be a 'fair' share of MPs for Dhulbahante?
SL is a democracy, and votes = representation.
Why is that concept ignored in your article @Jethro_Norman?
Here is a question for you , what would be a 'fair' share of MPs for Dhulbahante?
3. You also spoke of unresolved assassinations in LA.
What you failed to mention is that assassinations of prominent members of society also happen in other Dhulbahante territories not governed by Somaliland, e.g. Buuhoodle. Here is a thread on that:
What you failed to mention is that assassinations of prominent members of society also happen in other Dhulbahante territories not governed by Somaliland, e.g. Buuhoodle. Here is a thread on that:
More importantly, what does Somaliland gain from killing the Dhulbahante elders/politicians who actually believe in Somaliland?
Its an absurd line you push with virtually zero evidence.
Its an absurd line you push with virtually zero evidence.
On the other hand you ignore footage of sitting government officials in nearby Puntland promising to murder Somalilander Dhulbahante (whom they label as "traitors/horgal"). Why is that?
4. You also mentioned clearly inaccurate information, like Dhulbahante being pushed by Habar Jeclo out of Caynabo in the 1930s.
This is categorically false. Pushed by the likes of Markus Hoehne based verbatim on biased retelling of history by his Dhulbahante informants.
This is categorically false. Pushed by the likes of Markus Hoehne based verbatim on biased retelling of history by his Dhulbahante informants.
In reality Dhulbahante lived in Caynabo until 1955-1957, this is documented in official Somaliland Protectorate publications.
I have more, but we can stop here for now.
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