With all due respect to @volkerperthes, his views on the conflict in Darfur miss the mark in a number of ways that merit some pushback. First, the enumeration of the causes of violence in this piece as: 1. Seasonal migration 2. Armed banditry/criminality foreignpolicy.com
3. Return of fighters from Libya/Chad and only finally 4. "Some observers also blame government forces." Its outrageous not to see government forces and paramilitary allies as chiefly responsible for the violence against civilians. Second, the assertion that "local violence ..
often has or takes on a political dimension" misses the point that politics in the center are manipulating local grievances, not the other way around. Its a pattern we are seeing in Port Sudan, Kordofan, etc. The tail is not wagging the dog. Third, again the refrain that "Sudan’s
authorities have the responsibility to safeguard their own people" ignores that authorities are the chief abusers of people and suggests and underlying assumption that the military is in fact redeemable and can be taught to care about human rights above its own narrow interests.
There is nothing in evidence today that suggests this is true. Fourth, in defending his own mission's inability to help bring about peace anywhere in Sudan the idea that "the Sudanese state can no longer “outsource” the security of its citizens and refugees," suggests that UNAMID
was actually ever effective at providing security to Darfuris. It was not. True, violence has been lower than it is today and it is lower than at its height, but I would wager that no one there would say the UN ever provided effective security. That argument is a strong man
for avoiding responsibility for the deterioration of the security environment on @UNITAMS' watch. Fifth, "The current absence of a functioning government exacerbates the situation of a state whose presence in the peripheries has always been weak." Again, this misses a fundamental
of the power dynamics of the country. While service delivery and governance in the peripheries has been weak, the state's formal and informal security presence has been strong and dominant in all peripheral areas for sometime. Six, "There is no longer a civil war in Darfur...
The 2020 Sudanese Peace Agreement brought Sudan’s main armed groups into the political fold." Tell the Darfuris the war is over. The notion that the Juba Accord is anything but a trojan horse to deliver the military periphery allies in the capital is now laughable. Holding up the
JPA now as a credible peace document that holds similar, or greater weight, than the constitutional declaration only benefits the military perspective. Lastly, and this is my favorite, "we should fund projects to train and capacitate the Sudanese security forces to do their job..
..properly," ignores the fact that the military currently has no interest in its own reform--Im pretty sure that's why they carried out their coup and are actively killing, raping and torturing pro-democracy protesters.
This entire article is underpinned by an assumption that...
This entire article is underpinned by an assumption that...
the military is a credible, redeemable, responsible and rational actor that can be engaged on equal terms and as a co-equal partner in a governing coalition. I simply dont think that they can be and have done nothing since Oct 25 to suggest otherwise. Until western assumptions..
of the military changes, we will continue to agree to suboptimal outcomes for the people of Darfur and Sudan. Peace and democracy will remain elusive until we see the military for who they are--a predatory actor bent on their own survival and no one elses. End of rant.
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